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According to Schönpflug, an ecologically valid model of behavioral regulation should 
contain antecedent, focal, and consequential problem variables while allowing for a 
classification of primary versus auxiliary actions. To study individual differences in dynamic 
problem solving, the task simulation RISK is introduced. Within this task, highly anxious 
subjects were expected to demonstrate a greater safety expertise because of a hypothesized 
tendency to focus on risks and modify them. The results, however, indicated a preference 
for a more narrow focus: Highly anxious subjects directed their regulatory efforts primarily 
to focal and consequential problem variables. Yet, in RISK, this was a safe and also 
successful strategy.  
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Anxiety and the Regulation of Complex Problem-Situations: 
Playing it Safe? 
Anxiety and Behavior: Problem-Solving Strategies 
 Anxiety is a well-known everyday experience. At a quick glance, it may appear to the 
layperson as a simple, quasi holistic phenomenon. Taking a close look, however, one soon 
realizes that there are at least three systems involved when experiencing anxiety: the verbal, 
the physiological, and the behavioral system (cf. Lang, 1985). In situations that arouse the 
feeling of anxiety, all three systems usually will react. Furthermore, since the influential 
work of Charles Spielberger (1966, 1972), researchers discriminate between anxiety as a 
transitory emotional state and anxiety as a stable personality trait. With regard to these two 
dimensions, the present chapter focuses on individuals with high trait-anxiety and their 
behavioral strategies in dealing with complex problem situations.  
 Anxiety is a popular research field. Looking only into PsycLIT’s CD-ROM abstracts 
and only into the years from 1977 to 1995, one can easily retrieve over 7,000 journal 
articles that have the very word "anxiety" in their title, not to mention the several times 
more frequent publications that deal with anxiety despite a different main focus. Still, only 
a small percentage of this research is about anxiety and overt behavior, and this percentage 
gets even smaller when it comes to molar instead of molecular processes. Consider for 
example test-anxiety research. While there are many studies investigating performance 
deficits in high test-anxious individuals (cf. the meta-analyses of Hembree, 1988, and Seipp, 
1991), the number of studies dealing with regulatory strategies of how to compensate for 
these deficits is much smaller. For high-anxious individuals, heightened effort expenditure 
may be a means to compensate (see, e.g., Schönpflug, 1992), but as this is a rather simple, 
molecular strategy, it might have only limited generalizability to molar environmental 
variables (Baum, 1989).  
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 Therefore, one should also look at molar strategies, e.g., differences in problem-
solving behavior itself. Most of the studies that are looking at problem-solving strategies, 
however, depend on self-report measures. In all probability, these studies are biased not 
just because of common method variance but also because of the high-anxious persons’ 
negative look on both their personality and their abilities. When asking individuals about 
successful problem-solving strategies, it hence cannot surprise that most studies 
consistently show negative correlations between reported anxiety and reported behavior 
(e.g., Herrmann, Liepmann, & Otto, 1987; Stäudel, 1988).  
 Consequently, studies on behavioral regulation should not rely on self-reports only, 
especially when it comes to the assessment of problem-solving strategies. Besides, since the 
advent of microcomputers, psychology has received another powerful method apart from 
observation in the field, namely computer-simulations of ecological problem tasks. 
Simulating Ecological Problem-Situations 
The Lohhausen Simulations and Their Problems 
 In 1983, a book was published which had a considerable impact on the German 
psychology of problem solving. "Lohhausen. Problem solving in uncertain and complex 
problems" (Dörner, Kreuzig, Reither, & Stäudel, 1983), so the title of this book, introduced 
to psychology a new method for studying problem solving, namely the study of how 
individuals were regulating complex computer-simulated scenarios. Lohhausen itself is the 
simulation of a small town of 3,400 citizens. Like an ordinary town of this size, Lohhausen 
has a small factory, a bank, restaurants, shops, a school, and, of course, a town hall with a 
mayor. In the Lohhausen studies, the participants had to take the role of the mayor of the 
town -- a mayor vested with omnipotent powers -- and then to regulate the Lohhausen 
system for a simulated time span of 10 years.  
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 Compared with classical, well-specified problems such as the Tower of Hanoi (cf. 
Hyes & Simon, 1977) or Luchins’ water jug problems (cf. Atwood & Polson, 1976), the 
individuals who are solving a complex problem-simulation must satisfy quite different 
requirements (Funke, 1992, p. 25): "(1) they must deal with the complexity of the situation 
and with the connectivity of the variables involved; (2) they must deal with the 
intransparency or opaqueness of the situation since typically not all information that is 
needed is available; (3) they must deal with dynamic developments of variables which 
change their states autonomously and make it necessary to anticipate trends" -- everything 
just like in the "real world".  
 Partly due to this high ecological face-validity, the study of complex problem solving 
became very popular in the German-speaking countries. Numerous new scenarios were 
constructed, the most popular being "Moro" with the problem-solver acting as a Peace 
Corps worker in a third-world country (e.g., Strohschneider, 1986), "Tailorshop" with the 
problem-solver acting as the manager of a small shirt-factory (e.g., Süß, Kersting, & 
Oberauer, 1991), and "Fire" with the problem-solver acting as the head of a complex fire-
fighting operation within a simulated forest region (e.g., Schoppek, 1991).  
 However, the fast-growing field of complex problem solving soon started to 
encounter problems of its own (cf. Funke, 1992). First, while questioning the validity of 
traditional intelligence tests, the dependent measures of the complex problem-solving tasks 
themselves often were of doubtful reliability and validity. Second, results from one study 
could not easily be generalized to other scenarios. Finally and most important, the study of 
complex problem-solving often lacked a theoretical background which could integrate all 
the singular findings about different people regulating different scenarios in different ways. 
What, for example, does it mean when in the Moro simulation one person concentrates on 
fighting the tsetse fly while another person focuses on building water-wells? Beyond the 
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description of good versus poor strategies, there was and still is a need for a general, 
psychological frame of reference both for the variables of problem situations and for the 
actions of problem solvers.  
Dynamic Problem Situations: A Psychological Frame of Reference 
 Following the guidelines of the research program outlined by Schönpflug (1979a), 
our research group developed a frame of reference for the study of general and individual 
strategies in the regulation of simulated ecological problem-settings. Based on a set of 
propositions about how to portray the environment within psychological theories 
(Schönpflug, 1979b), Schönpflug developed a taxonomy for both variables in problem 
situations and actions in problem solving. This taxonomy therewith was used in the theory-
based construction of eco-psychological problem-scenarios that also would allow for 
testing predictions about behavioral strategies of high-anxious subjects. 
 With regard to variables, a problem situation can be modeled as a problem network 
that consists of three classes of variables. Considering their successive structure, these 
variables can be conceived of as focal problems, antecedents, and consequences 
(Schönpflug, 1984, p. 698). The variables of central interest are the focal problems; their 
state is crucial to the system. Therefore, they constitute the genuine problem variables (P). 
While these problem variables are influenced by antecedents or risks (R), they themselves 
again influence consequential variables or consequences (C). Both problems and 
consequences are variables of high affective valence, whereas the risks are not. Risks by 
themselves constitute no problem to be coped with; their potential lies only in the fact of 
directly aggravating focal problems and thereby indirectly aggravating negative 
consequences (Schönpflug, 1987, August). Figure 1 shows Schönpflug’s basic model for 
one focal problem.  
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insert Figure 1  
about here 
 
 With regard to actions, Schönpflug takes up a conceptualization of the Polish 
psychologist Tomaszewski (1978). According to his theory, the spectrum of regulatory 
operations can be divided into primary and secondary actions. Primary actions are 
productive, directly goal-oriented operations whereas secondary actions are merely 
supportive to the primary actions. Secondary actions once more can be divided into 
auxiliary actions and preventive actions, e.g., detecting risks in order to safeguard primary 
actions (see Mündelein & Schönpflug, 1983, p. 74).  
 In addition to these variables and actions, an eco-psychological problem-scenario 
should provide an option to disengage from regulatory operations. In this respect, 
Schönpflug distinguishes between disengagement as giving up and disengagement as an 
instrumental act. "In social systems, disengagement may be a strategy to engage other 
people’s help for one’s own problems, thus transferring the task to somebody else" 
(Schönpflug, 1985, p. 186). In dynamic problem-scenarios, there may as well be times when 
the problem solver can transfer the task to "somebody" else, namely to the simulated 
environment. When everything is going well by itself, one should deliberately disengage. 
Otherwise, regulation might lead to self-generated problems and cause new sources of 
stress (Schönpflug, 1985). Consider, as an example, watering your flowers too much or too 
often; instead of flourishing, they probably will become ill and eventually die.  
 To summarize, an ecologically valid model of complex problem-situations should 
contain antecedent, focal, and consequential problem variables and provide options to 
engage in primary and secondary actions as well as to disengage from regulatory behavior. 
These then were the directives when programming the RISK simulations. 
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The RISK Simulations 
 In the RISK simulations (Schönpflug, 1986), there are three classes of variables: risks 
(R), focal problem variables (P), and consequences (C). While all risk variables influence all 
problem variables and all problem variables again influence all consequence variables, only 
problems and consequences are of high affective valence according to Schönpflug’s frame 
of reference. Within the RISK simulations, this is achieved by instruction: the subjects are 
told that they may manipulate the variables of all three domains. At the end of a simulation, 
however, only the states of problem and consequence variables will count. Consequently, 
problem and consequence variables will be referred to as "the goal variables" (cf. Figure 2).  
 
insert Figure 2  
about here 
 
 In line with other studies on dynamic systems, RISK is intransparent: first, the 
subject does not know the exact nature of the interconnectivity; second, the states of all 
variables are not automatically provided to him/her. Basically, the problem solver has three 
options in dealing with the uncertainty and complexity of this RISKy situation. On each 
step, he/she has to decide whether (a) to check the current state of a variable (orientation) 
or (b) to modify a variable (modification) or -- since the simulation is dynamic -- (c) simply 
wait for one step (disengagement). Modifying variables without prior orientation, however, 
can be detrimental to the situation: if variables already are in a good state, a modification 
will do worse instead of better! And when antecedent variables deteriorate, this has a 
negative influence on all successive variables. 
 When antecedent variables are in a good state, however, this has a positive influence 
on all successive variables. By this construction, RISK allows for choosing an individual 
strategy on a continuum whose extreme points are the following two opposite strategies: 
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regulating the risks and thereby indirectly controlling the goal variables versus neglecting 
the risks and directly regulating the goal variables (cf. Figure 2). 
 Apart from permitting individual goal-oriented strategies, Schönpflug’s RISK 
simulation has the further advantage of being open to different problem presentations. 
Since Schönpflug’s model is a general frame of reference for complex problems, various 
situations can be modeled within the RISK shell. Up to date, there exist three versions: (1) 
a simulation of different settings in the work of tank-lorry drivers (Müller, 1991; Müller, 
Schönpflug, & Stöber, 1990), (2) an abstract, semantic-free version (Stöber, 1990), and (3) 
the original health version (Schönpflug, 1986; Stöber, 1990; see Figure 2). As the main 
focus of this chapter is on anxiety, methods and results from the study of Stöber (1990) 
will be used to demonstrate this line of research. 
Anxiety and the Regulation of Complex Problem-Situations  
Anxiety, Risk, and Safety 
 Returning to the study of anxiety, what predictions can be derived for interindividual 
differences in dealing with the variables and the action options within the RISK 
simulations? In his 1989 article on anxiety, prospective orientation, and prevention, 
Schönpflug reflects on a possible safety expertise in individuals with high levels of anxious 
worry. According to Schönpflug, orientation and prevention are intimately related to 
worries. "Whereas orientation leads to the construction and verification of worries, . . . 
preventive acts are designed and executed in order to modify the course of threatening 
events" (Schönpflug, 1989, p. 248). Consequently, high-anxious individuals should operate 
like "safety experts" who attentively scan the environment for potential risks and, if they 
detect any, try to modify them. Evidence in support of this idea can be found, e.g., in the 
studies by Butler and Mathews (1987) about high-anxious subjects having a heightened 
risk-perception or in the research by Beck (cf. Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson, & Riskind, 
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1987) about anxiety being characterized by the theme of danger. Within the RISK 
simulations, one therefore would expect that high-anxious individuals show more 
secondary actions, that is generally more active orientation and specifically more risk 
regulation.  
 However, there are certain reservations concerning these hypotheses. Already 
Schönpflug (1989, p. 256) points out that "as a strong emotional state, anxiety seems not to 
be favorable for sophisticated cognitive elaborations and detailed preparation and 
prevention." Due to limited processing capacity (cf. Eysenck, 1979), one would expect of 
the high-anxious subjects a fairly poor problem-solving performance (see the meta-analyses 
cited  
above). Yet, as previously mentioned, studies regarding actual behavior of high-anxious 
individuals are sparse, particularly studies regarding molar behavioral variables. Therefore, 
it still is an open question whether or not previous findings generalize to strategic 
preferences of high-anxious individuals when dealing with a rather complex task. But 
before looking closer at interindividual differences in simulated situations, one should take 
a close look at the situations first. 
Tailoring RISK for the Study of Anxiety 
 Some psychological situations are "powerful to the degree that they lead everyone to 
construe the particular events the same way [and] induce uniform expectancies regarding 
the most appropriate response pattern" (Mischel, 1977, p. 347). In order for individual 
differences to make a difference, however, the situation must be sufficiently "weak". If the 
problem-task should be sensitive to individual strategies, it must provide enough degrees of 
freedom on the path to a solution.  
 To guarantee that a high problem-solving score can be attained with different 
strategies, it was necessary to test the RISK simulation before the main study. This was 
Anxiety: Playing it Safe?     10 
done by simulating different simple strategies that systematically varied the percentage of 
modifications directed at the risk variables. Stepwise, the parameters of the RISK program 
were adjusted until a solution was found that resulted in approximately equal problem-
solving scores along the continuum between regulating only the risk variables and 
regulating only the goal variables (cf. above). Accordingly, the final version of RISK does 
not impose a certain strategy onto the individual and thus obstruct the relevation of 
personal preferences: a person with a preference for focusing on risks and a person with a 
preference for focusing on problems and consequences, they both can obtain the same 
problem-solving score as the following results will show. 
Anxiety and RISK: Playing it Safe 
 A total of sixty subjects completed the trait scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(German version by Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & Spielberger, 1981). Afterwards they 
had to play the RISK simulation with the objective to regulate the simulated problem-
situation for 100 cycles. On each cycle, the subject had to decide whether to look up the 
state of a variable (orientation), to modify the variable (modification), or to sit out for one 
cycle (disengagement). Subjects were told, that after 100 cycles the game would be over and 
a problem-solving score was computed by looking at the state of the goal variables (viz., 
problem and consequence variables) while the state of the risk variables would be of no 
relevance. The better states they would achieve for the goal variables the better their 
problem solution would be. To improve the reliability of the dependent measures, each 
subject had to solve the RISK simulation four times so that the scores could be aggregated. 
 First of all, the results show no difference with regard to secondary actions: high-
anxious subjects do not engage more in active orientation. However, a significant 
difference between high- and low-anxious subjects was found for the three classes of 
problem variables (see Figure 3). While there is no difference in regulating the risks (R), 
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high-anxious subjects concentrate their effort on the goal variables. Summing across 
actions (orientations plus modifications) and variables (problems plus consequences, i.e., P 
+ C), there is a highly significant effect for trait-anxiety. When regulating the RISK 
environment, high-anxious individuals more closely stick to the central variables with both 
orienting and modifying actions. Instead of regulating the goal variables by controlling the 
risks, they rather monitor the central variables and modify them when their states change 
unfavorably.  
 Yet, is this a successful strategy? In the context of the given task, it is. With the 
anchors being 0% when all goal variables are in the worst possible state and 100% when 
they all are in the best possible state, high- and low-anxious subjects arrive at the same 
problem-solving score (63.2% versus 60.0%, p = .60, two-tailed). Because RISK was 
designed to allow for different strategies, ignoring the risks is not too risky so that high-
anxious subjects regulate the problem-situation with the same effectiveness as low-anxious 
subjects. 
 
insert Figure 3  
about here 
 
 But what about effort? While arriving at the same problem-solving score, high-
anxious subjects choose the option "disengagement" significantly less often than low-
anxious subjects (see Figure 3). Consequently, an efficiency score was calculated by dividing 
the standardized problem-solving score by the standardized frequency of all regulatory 
actions. Thus, while being as effective as low-anxious subjects, high-anxious subjects turn 
out to be slightly less efficient (with p < .06, one-tailed, this difference is marginally 
significant).  
Conclusions 
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 At the first look, the results of this study corroborate theories and results that stress 
the dysfunctional aspects of anxiety. Being as effective, but expending more effort, high-
anxious subjects are less efficient, a result well in accordance with Eysenck’s processing 
efficiency theory (cf. his chapter in this book). Besides, the results of this study also can be 
interpreted within the frame of attentional phenomena associated with anxiety where "high 
trait anxiety has been found to be associated with a reduction [italics added] in the breadth 
of attention in conditions permitting focused attention" (Eysenck, 1992, p. 76) as it is the 
case in the RISK simulations.  
 From another point of view, however, the results can be seen quite differently. First, 
in this self-paced task, high-anxious individuals do not invest more time in regulating the 
RISK simulation -- a finding that would not speak for a lesser efficiency. On the contrary, 
one could even argue for a greater efficiency of the highly anxious because they cut down 
the problem tree and concentrate on the main variables. Furthermore, choosing the 
strategy to rather ignore the risks could be interpreted as problem-solving restructuration 
by elimination of implicit constraints (Richard, Poitrenaud, & Tijus, 1993). Regulating 
predominantly problems and consequences, the highly anxious limit their task space for 
both active orientations and modifications. Instead of caring for distal risks, they set a 
proximal subgoal, which is a means for boosting one’s perceived self-efficacy (Stock & 
Cervone, 1990). Solving a more simplified model of a complex model, that is solving RISK 
with lesser risk regulations, might be a "weak method" (cf. Polson & Jeffries, 1985). In the 
RISK simulation, this is a valid and -- with regard to the goal variables -- safe strategy.  
 Nevertheless, disregarding potent risks hardly is a safety strategy. Although the high-
anxious individuals know about the risks, they do not use a preventive strategy. Instead, 
they engage in regulatory behavior that could be described with the ugly German word 
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"Symptombehandlung", meaning that someone is treating only the symptoms but not the 
causes -- a rather narrow focus on ecological problem networks.  
 Therefore, the search for problem situations where anxious strategies are expert 
strategies is still on. But, no matter whether you look for safety expertise (Schönpflug, 
1989) or catastrophes (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991), anxiety research as well as the study of 
complex problem-solving sure can benefit from a macro-level perspective like 
Schönpflug’s, that is a perspective on both situational variables and individual actions 
within a general, eco-psychological model of regulation and disregulation. 
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Figure 1. Schönpflug’s model of problem variables. 
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Figure 2. The health version of Schönpflug’s RISK simulation. 
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Figure 3. Trait-anxiety and the frequency of regulatory actions in the RISK simulation.  
N = 60. * p < .05, ** p < .01, one-tailed. 
 
